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How SECURE IS THE BRAZILIAN
PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM?
Ali El Hage Filho*
I. INTRODUCTION
RIVATE pensions are expected, above any other obligation, to
provide its beneficiaries with the precise benefits for which they
contracted. In other words, private pension funds must endow the
general public with enough confidence to encourage people to look for
pension funds and join pension plans, allowing them to believe that they
are building a better retirement.
Different from other forms of savings or investments, private pension
plans are a long-term project, sometimes initiated at a young age, with
results seen only decades later. For this reason, confidence is of immense
concern. People must have ways to ensure that during this long period
their personal funds will be properly separated.
Administering people's savings over the course of a lifetime in a way
that delivers the contracted for benefit is a complex task. Over this long
period of time, many events may occur that could be severely harmful to
such "savings administration."
The present study will focus primarily on the financial risks inherent to
private pension businesses and the legal instruments available to avoid
such risks. The purpose of the present study is ultimately to assess the
level of financial security existent in the Brazilian Private Pension System
(hereinafter BPPS) as provided by its current legal framework. Three
sections will follow: first, a general overview of the financial security of
private pension systems and the main issues that should be of concern in
creating a financially sound pension environment; second, a general un-
derstanding about BPPS and its legal structure, historical background,
legislative evolution, and perspectives on the future; and third, BPPS's
financial security will be assessed.
II. FINANCIAL SECURITY OF PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEMS
Several risks are inherent to operating any kind of business, and pri-
vate pension funds are no different. In fact, private pension funds play a
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major role in financial markets, causing a link between financial risks and
their activities.
The title "Financial Security of Private Pension Systems" is related to
the degree of a system's protection against financial risks. This protection
is provided primarily by an adequate regulatory and supervisory
framework.
Therefore, the first task of governmental authorities when creating a
financially sound private pension system is identifying the risks involved
in implementing applicable regulations and effective supervision. So
what are the main "financial risks" that should be of concern to regula-
tors? Andre Laboul, in his article Private Pensions Systems: Regulatory
Policies, identifies the "risks which have more to do with financial fea-
tures of private systems," listing them as follows:
* risk of the fund becoming insolvent;
* investment portfolio risk for the employer in defined benefit
plans, and for employees in defined contribution schemes;
* interest-rate and inflation risks in funded schemes;
• risk of employers failing to make adequate contributions, in all
plans;
* risk of misappropriation, in all plans;
• risk that the employer's pension policy may change with regard to
non-mandatory benefits;
" risk that the sponsor may change (e.g. following a take-over or
merger);
" risk of default by an entity other than the fund (e.g. the insurance
company);
" longevity risks for plans paying out annuities;
" risks from the structural shortcomings of certain systems.'
Private pensions operate by collecting contributions, managing assets,
and paying benefits. It could be said that "managing" is what makes pos-
sible the achievement of the latter purpose of paying benefits. Conse-
quently, financial risks lay substantially in this area.
In managing the collected contributions and. planning all future collec-
tions, a fund manager has to administer investments and maintain ade-
quate reserves, thus protecting them from various risks in the cheapest
fashion possible. In other words, to establish confidence, a financially
sound private pension system must consist of an adequate regulatory and
supervisory framework, a competent management, adequate rules for in-
vestment, mechanisms to guarantee and preserve a fund's solvency, and
guarantees of full access to information for plan members.
Moreover, adequate tax treatment is greatly responsible for the nurtur-
ing of a private pension system. Issues raised above might deliver the
1. ANDRE LABOUL, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PRIVATE PENSIONS
SYSTEMS: REGULATORY POLICIES AGEING WORKING PAPERS No. 2.2, at 59
(1998), available ai http:/www.worldbank.org/wbi/banking/insurance/contractual/
pdf/LABouL.pdf.
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highest level of confidence possible but are worthless if increased tax ben-
efits are not available to motivate savings through pension plans.
In conclusion, a financially secure private pension system provides ef-
fective regulatory and supervisory structures, governance rules, disclo-
sure, investment regulations, funding requirements, solvency
mechanisms, and taxation.
A. REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY STRUCTURES
A regulatory framework for a private pension system serves the pur-
poses of promoting resources mobilization and allocation through a struc-
ture that guarantees transparency, security, and stability, minimizes costs,
and promotes sound investment decisions. This regulatory framework is
similar to the other segments of the financial sector.2
Moreover, a regulatory framework must begin with the assessment and
identification of potential risks. 3 It must also be set up in such a way that
the appropriate supervisory environment is created. In other words, it is
imperative that governmental authorities provide supervisors with every
necessary resource and capability for the exercise of effective supervi-
sion.4 While there is no consensus as to a single appropriate regulatory
and supervisory framework for private pension systems, certain countries
count with a comprehensive law, addressing the various issues in relation
to the system, while other countries provide regulations in separate pieces
of legislation.5 Regulatory and supervisory bodies also vary from one
country to the other as special agencies, ministries, and insurance authori-
ties are used as regulators and supervisors in most countries.
In addition, tax and financial market authorities are significantly pre-
sent in private pension regulation and supervision. However, while those
authorities provide significant assistance, it can be said that insurance and
financial market authorities are predominant in regulating and supervis-
ing private pensions. 6 In the majority of Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (hereinafter OECD) countries, private pen-
sion regulators and supervisors are the same as the ones for insurance
companies. This is certainly due to the fact that the supervision of pen-
sion funds is closely related to that of insurance companies. However,
there have been some criticisms to this structure. Some argue that regu-
lations governing insurance business are more stringent and should be
based on the nature of the pension system rather than on the pension
2. ROBERTO ROCHA, RICHARD HINZ, & JOAQUIN GUTIERREZ, IMPROVING THE
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF PENSION FUNDS: ARE THERE LESSONS FROM
THE BANKING SECTORS? (The World Bank, Social Protection Discussion Paper
Series No. 9929, Dec. 1999), available at http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org/html/
FinancialSectorWeb.nsf/(attachmentweb)/spdpOOO2/$FilespdpOOO2.pdf.
3. Id. at 16.
4. LABOUL, supra note 1, at 59.
5. Id. at 58 (as in the case of United States, Netherlands, Spain, Austria Italy, and
United Kingdom).
6. Id. at 59.
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system provider. 7 These critics are motivated by the fact that differences
exist between insurance and pension businesses, however, such a regula-
tory position relates more closely with market competition protection,
since:
some countries may consider that the market should be segmented,
and that any differences in the characteristics of the various opera-
tors mean that separate markets should be defined, depending on the
institutions involved; other countries may decide, while recognising
that such differences exist, to limit all regulatory distortion and to
aim, inter alia, for functional regulation based on operations rather
than institutions, distinguishing or not between operations (e.g. sec-
ond vs. third pillar, obligation of result vs. best effort, etc.). 8
There are several possible approaches to supervision methods. These
can diverge according to government perspectives, risk exposure, and
market structure, among other factors. However, certain basic elements
are targets of most all supervisors: (i) compliance with legal and contrac-
tual obligations; (ii) financial and actuarial controls; (iii) management su-
pervision; and (iv) economic reviews.9
The three basic "building blocks" suggested by the Basle Committee to
structure banking supervision, namely (i) ex-ante licensing activities, (ii)
ongoing monitoring and inspections, and (iii) remedial and punitive prob-
lem resolution can also be seen as applicable to private pension supervi-
sion. 10 Such suggestion provides an interesting and comprehensive
approach encompassing all the expected functions of a proper supervi-
sory framework.
Licensing of pension funds constitutes one of the primary functions of
supervisors. Proper regulations should exist imposing standards and re-
quirements for the creation of new pension funds or the restructuring of
existing accounts. In addition, a certain level of discretionary authority
should remain with supervisors.11
Second, ongoing monitoring and inspections include supervision over-
sight in two main forms: off-site and on-site surveillance. Off-site surveil-
lance is generically a review by supervisors of a private pension fund's
accounting and financial statements, which justifies rules on reporting, in-
ternal and external audits, and disclosure. On-site supervision is foreseen
by all legal systems by granting supervisors the authority to access all the
records and examine other relevant materials on-site. This can be struc-
tured as audits, in which there is a systematic attempt to review all aspects
of the fund's activities by tracing contributions through to individual ac-
counts, verifying the completeness and accuracy of financial statements,
and evaluating adherence to investment limitations and other
7. See id. at 63 (discussing an opinion of the Comite European des Assurances).
8. Id. at 61.
9. Id.
10. ROCHA, supra note 2, at 24.
11. Id. at 8.
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requirements.12
Last, remedial and punitive problem resolution generally empowers su-
pervisors with the authority to direct pension funds to make changes in
their operations by applying corrective and punitive actions.
B. GOVERNANCE RULES
Governance of pension plans consists of all the relationships between
the different entities and persons involved in the management of the pen-
sion plan. It also provides the structure through which the objectives of a
pension plan are set and the means of attaining those objectives and mon-
itoring performance. 13
Pension fund governance regulations should therefore promote the ad-
ministration of pension funds in the best interest of plan members and
beneficiaries. Effective regulation of the governance structure of pension
funds includes: the establishment of a transparent framework for the divi-
sion of responsibilities in the operation; oversight of the pension fund,
and accountability for all parties involved in the pension fund process.
Governance regulations must also define the mechanisms for internal
control, communication, and redress.14
Several efforts have been carried out in order to establish good govern-
ance practices throughout pension funds after incidents such as the Max-
well case in the United Kingdom1 5 and the diversion of union pension
funds in the United States by organized crime syndicates in the 60's and
70's.16
OECD's Working Party on Private Pensions released in 2002 the so-
called "Guidelines for Pension Fund Governance." These guidelines
were developed as part of an OECD project on financial governance and
have drawn much inspiration from the existing "OECD Principles of Cor-
porate Governance. ' 17 Twelve principles were set for a pension fund's
governance structure and mechanisms: (i) identification of responsibili-
ties; (ii) governing body; (iii) expert advice; (iv) auditor; (v) actuary; (vi)
custodian; (vii) accountability; (viii) suitability; (ix) internal controls; (x)
reporting; (xi) disclosure; and (xii) redress. 18
12. Id. at 26.
13. JUAN YERMO & ANNAMARIA MAROSSY, PENSION FUND GOVERNANCE, Second
Org. For Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. Conference on Private Pensions in Brazil,
San Paul, Brazil (May 23-24, 2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/48
2084639.pdf.
14. ROCHA, supra note 2, at 26.
15. Maxwell company's main pension fund lost a large part of its assets as a result of
lending to and investing in insolvent companies linked to the late Robert Maxwell.
16. See ROCHA, supra note 2, at 16.
17. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GUIDELINES FOR PENSION FUND Gov-
ERNANCE (July 2002) (OECD Pension Fund Governance Principles aim particu-
larly at autonomous, collective, and group pension funds and do not give
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Therefore regulators must direct their efforts to the development of an
adequate framework, with minimal requirements as to structure and
mechanisms of governance of pension funds. Although generally broad,
OECD guidelines enumerate main topics that should be covered by
regulation.
Pension Fund Governance, by Juan Yermo and Ammamnnia Marossy
lists aspects of concern to regulators when addressing pension fund gov-
ernance structure and its mechanisms. 19 Regulation should cover the fol-
lowing issues when dealing with governing structure:
* the legal form that a pension fund can take;
* whether the governing body or administrator will be internal or
external to the pension fund, and whether employers or plan
sponsors also play a role in it;
* the responsibilities of the governing body, its accountability, and
the suitability requirements for being a member of the governing
body or provide professional services to a pension fund;
* the extent of functional delegation required or possible for spe-
cific duties such as actuarial analysis, auditing, asset management,
and benefit payment administration;20
As to governing mechanisms, regulation should take into account:
" internal controls to address conflicts of interest, ensure adequate
incentives through performance reviews and appropriate com-
pensation, and ensure efficient communication channels within
the pension fund;
* disclosure of relevant information to pension fund members on a
timely and clear manner;
" redress mechanisms for pension plan members and beneficiaries
to discipline mismanagement by those responsible for the opera-
tion and oversight of the pension fund. 21
Moreover, regulators should bear in mind the different regulatory
treatment required by different types of plans, natures, and legal forms of
pension funds. For instance, the main governance issues related to de-
fined contribution (DC) plans are over the timely payment of contribu-
tions and benefits, the management of plans' assets, and reporting and
disclosure, since the plan's benefits are determined purely on the basis of
the interest earned on invested assets. On the other hand, defined bene-
fit (DB) plans require additional governance concerns, such as more rig-
orous monitoring and internal controls, as they create additional
responsibility for the plan sponsor and the plan administrator to provide
a minimum rate of return on investments or annuitisation rates. 22
19. YORMO & MAROSSY, supra note 13.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 4.
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C. DISCLOSURE
Disclosure rules for pension funds are meant to encompass information
to plan participants and the general public as well as reporting require-
ments for the supervisory and regulatory authorities. A fund should keep
all information transparent in connection with its financial position as
well as its own rules and requirements on its relationship with its
members.
Members must be informed about the situation of the fund in order to
be able to exert discipline and control over the fund's situation and super-
visors should be provided with enough information to monitor funds
thoroughly. Enhanced disclosure requirements are also a substantial con-
tribution to the containment of agency risks and promotion of market
discipline. This includes several important limitations, such as asset valua-
tion rules, the frequency of asset valuation, and the distribution of rele-
vant information to fund members and the general public.23
Open and closed funds may be subjected to different levels of disclo-
sure requirements, especially due to the possibility of individual switching
of plans available in open funds. According to findings made by RoCHA,
Hinz, and Gutierrez, open funds in most Latin American countries are
subject to extensive disclosure requirements, which usually include daily
asset valuation on a "mark to market" basis, account statements made
available to members several times a year, and the publication of exten-
sive and detailed information on the industry by the supervision agency,
through quarterly and annual bulletins. Such an extensive disclosure of
information is designed to enable workers to make informed choices and
to put competitive pressure on asset managers, and also to allow switch-
ing on a fair basis.24
Nonetheless, this does not mean that closed pension fund's disclosure
of information is not an issue that requires less attention. In this sense,
the OECD, in its Fifteen Principles for the Regulation of Private Occupa-
tional Pension Schemes, elaborated principle fourteen, establishing that:
Appropriate disclosure and education should be promoted as re-
gards respective costs and benefits characteristics of pension
schemes, especially where individual choice is offered. Beneficiaries
should be educated on misuse of retirement benefits (in particular in
case of lump sum) and adequate preservation of their rights. Disclo-
sure of fees structure, plans performance and benefits modalities
should be especially promoted in the case of individual pension
plans.25
Furthermore, in his article Laboul highlights the suggestions of the
23. See ROCHA, supra note 2, at 20.
24. Id.
25. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR THE REGULA-
TION OF PRIVATE OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS SCHEMES, Second Org. For Econ. Co-
Operation & Dev. Conference on Private Pensions in Brazil, San Paul, Brazil
(May 23-24, 2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/0/2084733.pdf.
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"Goode Committee Report" 26 as to information that should be provided
to employees prior to joining a plan or while they are members of it:
* a statement of whether the scheme is registered with the Regula-
tor and its registration number;
* a full statement of the nature of the pension promise detailing
contributions payable, scheme benefits, and how those benefits
are secured;
* a statement of the scheme's past policy with respect to pension
increases, which should be contained in the annual report;
* details of trustee arrangements;
* a general statement of the powers to make scheme amendments,
the use of surplus, the application of funds in the event of wind-
ing-up, and the steps to be taken if the scheme has a deficiency;
* a statement of the members' rights to further information, and
how this can be obtained.27
A private pension system should be transparent to both plan members
and supervisors, allowing them to monitor and assess pension funds, thus
fostering confidence in the system.
D. INVESTMENT REGULATIONS
Investment regulations of pension funds should aim at assuring safe-
keeping and profitability of funds invested, taking into consideration con-
sumer/investor protection and macroeconomic issues. 28 Limits on
holdings by issuer, types of instrument, and asset classes are the main
topics of concern to regulators in connection with investment regulations.
The OECD Insurance Committee approved in 1999 a list of principles
applicable to investments of insurance companies and pension funds.29
Diversification and dispersion, maturity, and currency matching are es-
tablished as basic conditions on investments. OECD principles also sug-
gest that investment regulations should be concerned with the risks
inherent both in the investments themselves and in the commitments that
those investments are intended to cover by incorporating institutional
and functional considerations. These principles have stated that "while
regulation inevitably takes place within an institutional context, it must
focus as closely as possible on the liabilities being covered (by these in-
26. In 1993, the United Kingdom established the Goode Committee to review the
country's pension law for the purpose of pension reform. The committee gener-
ated a report with recommendations that led to the implementation of the Pen-
sions Act of 1995.
27. LABOUL, supra note 1.
28. GERRY DICKINSON, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PRINCIPLES FOR
INVESTMENT REGULATION OF PENSION FUNDS, INSURANCE AND PRIVATE PEN-
SIONS COMPENSATION FOR EMERGING ECONOMICS BOOK I, at Part (4)c (2001),
available at http:/www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/19/1813764.pdf.
29. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INSURANCE COMMITTEE, SELECTED
PRINCIPLES FOR THE REGULATION OF INVESTMENTS BY INSURANCE COMPANIES
AND PENSION FUNDS, Second Org. For Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. Conference
on Private Pensions in Brazil, San Paulo, Brazil (May 23-24, 2002), available at
http://www.inprs.org/data/policies/files/selectedprinciples.pdf.
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vestments), their characteristics, and in particular, their maturities - thus
promoting a functional approach. '30
Moreover, said principles set standards on regulatory coverage (invest-
ments of technical provisions should be distinguished from investments of
the capital/surplus base), regulation and internal controls (governmental
function should be limited to assessing the adequacy of internal controls)
and investment rules per se.
Some concepts in connection with the appropriateness of regulations as
to managing pension funds' assets are widely discussed by authors,
namely whether regulation should dictate ceilings to investment on cer-
tain types of assets or should this control be exercised at the prudence of
pension fund managers (prudent man rule versus quantitative ap-
proach). 3 1 Furthermore, this is an important issue to be considered by
regulators because it has significant security and macroeconomic impacts
relates to liberalising foreign investment by pension funds.32
1. Prudent Man Rule vs. Quantitative Restrictions
Certain countries do not impose restrictions on investments by asset
class, relying basically on general guidelines established by law and on the
prudence of fund managers. Others enforce more stringent rules, specify-
ing types of assets in which a pension fund may invest its reserves as well
as limits in connection with such investments. This is generally the con-
cept that distinguishes the "prudent person approach" from the "quanti-
tative approach."
Limits or restrictions imposed on investment of pension fund assets are
mainly concerned with assuring diversification and with levels of default
or liquidity risk that different classes of assets may have. DICKINSON cate-
gorizes the types of restrictions on investment that can be applied to pen-
sion funds: (i) lists of approved classes of financial assets that can be held;
(ii) maximum percentages of "total" investments that can be held in a
given class of investment; (iii) maximum limit on the proportion of "to-
tal" investments that can be held in a single investment; (iv) restrictions
on the maturity or duration matching of assets and liabilities; (v) currency
matching requirements for assets and liabilities; and (vi) regulations on
the use of financial derivatives in asset management.33
In principle, investment restrictions may seem counterproductive, as
they may prevent diversification and expose fund members to a greater
degree of portfolio risk. On the other hand, it is acceptable that invest-
ment restrictions may be justified in countries with underdeveloped insti-
tutional and regulatory structures and shallow or illiquid asset markets.34
30. Id.
31. See LABOUL. supra note 1; ROCHA, supra note 2.
32. See LABOUL, supra note 1, at 68.
33. DICKINSON, supra note 27.
34. ROCHA, supra note 2.
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Andre Laboul's article draws attention to the debate over which ap-
proach is better, the quantitative or the prudent man approach, mention-
ing that this depends on a number of variables. 35 In this sense, critiques
are made to both approaches. For example, quantitative restrictions tend
to change infrequently, and do not keep up with changes in the product
characteristics and capital market conditions. In addition, the prudent
man rules can be imprecise. 36
2. Foreign Investment
Pension fund assets represent an important proportion of both the
stock and flow of long-term national savings. Regulations sometimes
take this into account to the extent of influencing the direction of the
investment of these assets. In addition, one economic rationale is that
pension fund liabilities are domestic, therefore investing locally permits
assets and liabilities to be denominated in the same currency.
Arguments in favor of restrictions on foreign investments are mostly
based on ?the "need to shield pension plan members from foreign-ex-
change risks" and on the "possibility of a system-wide risk, in the event of
default by institutional investors, which would cause a domino effect
throughout the financial system."'37
On the other hand, the liberalisation of foreign investment has found
significant support in literature.38 These readings point out some coun-
tries' experiences (essentially the Chilean gradual liberalization) based on
arguments of risk reduction offered by international diversification.
Hence, lowering controls on foreign investment can be justified as insti-
tutional investors have access to sophisticated and effective instruments
for hedging their foreign-currency positions. In addition, "returns on in-
ternationally diversified portfolios, with a better balance between country
and currency risks, have proved more stable than non-diversified
portfolios." 39
Therefore, the macroeconomic standpoint as to regulating foreign in-
vestments by pension funds sounds more persuasive than basing such re-
strictions on foreign-exchange risk protection. It sounds more reasonable
for a government to impose restrictions on foreign investment due to its
intention of ensuring that national savings are invested in the domestic
economy and encouraging the flow of investment funds into government
securities and projects favoured by the government. 40
35. LABOUL, supra note 1.
36. Id.
37. id.
38. HELMUT REISEN, LIBERALISING FOREIGN INVESTMENTS BY PENSION FUNDS: POSI-
TIVE AND NORMATIVE ASPECTS, TECHNICAL PAPER No. 120 (Jan. 1997), available
at http:/www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/55/1919866.pdf.
39. LABOUL, supra note 1.
40. REISEN, supra note 37 (arguing there is not enough evidence that pension fund
contribution is significant to financial development, as well as to the constitution of
national savings and capital market growth).
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E. FUNDING REQUIREMENTS
A pension fund must design its structure and mechanisms in connec-
tion with financing its plans, i.e., how it is going to handle the collection
and administration of funds so as to guarantee plan participants' benefits.
This includes the formation of pension funds, which is the approach taken
as to keep funding levels and standards of dealing with deficits and
surpluses.
Employers may set up pension schemes with respect to their employees
in several ways according to what is permitted by local legislation. Inter-
nal or external mechanisms (within the employer's businesses) may be set
up to constitute reserves guaranteeing employees' benefits.
Gollier, in his article Insurance and Private Pensions Compendium for
Emerging Economies, lists and explains internal and external financing
mechanisms for pension schemes.41 As internal mechanisms, employers
may adopt "overhead expenses budget," "book reserves," or "individual
pension guarantees." Self-administered pension funds and group insur-
ance are considered to be external mechanisms. The first internal mecha-
nism, overhead expenses budget, refers to payments made according to
company's internal rules directly out of the company's budget for over-
head expenses. In a similar fashion, "individual pension guarantees" may
be adopted when a company wishes to provide special pension benefits to
some of its employees or officers on an individual basis. Book reserves
are reserves set aside on the company's books with the purpose of provid-
ing pensions to its employees. Such internal mechanisms are considered
to be defective, especially due to the fact that employees' benefits are not
protected against employers' bankruptcy. On the other hand, some type
of insurance against the employers' insolvency may be contracted in or-
der to minimize this problem.42
Self-administered pension funds are legal entities distinct from the em-
ployers; therefore they are shielded against most of the employers' or
other related-companies' risks. In group insurance mechanisms, the em-
ployer and insurer jointly draft a group insurance contract specifying the
respective rights and obligations of the parties. 43
In all of the cases above, a minimum funding level must be required
from the pension schemes to ensure that they are able to fulfill its present
and future obligations. Winding-up and on-going approaches are dis-
cussed among authors and regulators. The first looks at a fund from the
perspective of its winding-up, while the second emphasises the notion of
long-term equilibrium and considers the system as an on-going concern. 44
41. JFAN-JACOUFS Goi.LIER, ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION & DEv., INSURANCE
AND PRIVATE PENSIONS COMPENDIUM FOR EMERGING ECONOMIES, 10, available
at http:/www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/36/1816189.doc (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 11.
44. LABOUL, supra note 1, at 46.
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Labour indicates the main types of funding rules in connection to the
approaches above mentioned:
* BO, or "accumulated benefit obligation," corresponds to what a
defined-benefit pension plan would have to pay out, as measured
by vested rights at current pay rates in the event of immediate
termination;
* PBO, or "projected benefit obligation," which corresponds to the
ABO, but takes into account estimated final pay rates;
* GBO, or "Guarantee benefit obligation," which corresponds to
the ABO with a minimum benefit guarantee.
* IBO, or "indexed benefit obligation," which corresponds to the
ABO with indexed vested rights.45
* IBO, or "indexed benefit obligation," which corresponds to the
ABO with indexed vested rights.46
In its Fifteen Principles, OECD dedicated one principle to funding
rules suggesting the following:
Private schemes should be funded. While full-funding exists in princi-
ple for defined contribution plans, other types of plans should be
subject to minimum funding rules or other mechanisms to ensure ad-
equate funding of pension liabilities. Rules based on winding-up ap-
proach (e.g. ABO, PBO) may be promoted as a minimum level to
complement the on-going approach. Flexibility can be allowed for
temporary limited under-funding under restricted circumstances.
Consideration should be given to the development of adequate but
flexible requirements for minimum capital/guarantee in pension
funds,-taking account of the long term nature of their liabilities.
Tax and prudential regulations should encourage a prudent level of
funding. Private unfunded pay-as-you-go schemes at individual com-
pany level (i.e. overheads schemes) should be prohibited. 47
Therefore, an adequate set of rules of funding for pension funds should
take into account the principles and approaches above in addition to rules
of handling surpluses and under-funding situations.
It is controversial whether employers should own surpluses. On the
one hand, employers have the duty to make up for deficits and should be
entitled to surpluses. On the other hand, employees may be considered
to have a claim to surpluses similar to profit-sharing rights under life in-
surance. Hence, regulation should either establish ownership/sharing of
surpluses or require that this should be agreed to in the relevant con-
tracts.48 In addition, regulation should focus on utilization of surpluses
for granting "contribution holydays," increasing benefits or creating extra
reserves, setting conditions, and other relevant occasions.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. OECD Fifteen Principles for the Regulation of Private Occupational Pension
Scheemes, Insurance and Private Pensions Compendium for Emerging Economies,
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/3212403207.pdf.(Iast visited May 12,
2003).
48. LABOUL, supra note 1, at 52.
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Regulation should tackle under-funding by following a set of technical
issues and principles. 49 Generally, employers and employees are called
upon to rectify any situation of under-funding, which includes measures
of increasing contributions.
F. SOLVENCY MECHANISMS
Funding requirements, investment restrictions, disclosure, and other is-
sues may be considered as mechanisms applicable to containing pension
fund insolvency risks. This sub-section will focus more specifically on
government-run protection systems that are available to preserve a pen-
sion fund's solvency. Such systems guarantee that at any moment, re-
gardless of the events that might be interfering with the relevant fund's
performance, plan participants will be able to obtain their respective ben-
efits. Generally such mechanisms aim at shielding pension plans from the
risk of bankruptcy by the sponsor in the event that a plan is insufficiently
funded.50
Governmental agencies usually provide such systems, since it is as-
sumed that the market cannot provide this kind of protection at an af-
fordable price.5 1 This is usually done by "plan termination insurance,"
which would be utilized to protect the employees' pensions in the event
the plan is under-funded, particularly at the employer's bankruptcy. Sev-
eral countries have adopted such mechanisms.
In the United States, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC) is a federal agency that was set up in 1974 to ensure and protect
pension benefits in private DB plans. The majority of its financing comes
from insurance premiums paid by companies whose plans it protects and
not from taxes. Sweden offers a similar compensation fund in which com-
panies that have poorer credit ratings pay a higher rate. In Germany,
there is the PSVaG, a mutual insurance company that purchases annuities
from a consortium of private-sector insurance companies. In the United
Kingdom, there is the PCS (Pensions Compensation Scheme), which
meets the cost of benefits only where fraud has occurred.52
It is important to distinguish between countries that have funding re-
quirements and countries that operate under the book reserves method.
In the latter, plan termination insurance is essential if accrued pension
benefits are to be protected from bankruptcy risk. When there are fund-
ing requirements, the case for public provision of plan termination insur-
49. Id. at 53 (stating "Even though prudential principles call for a winding-up ap-
proach, a healthy fund can sometimes find itself under-funded without its viability
being affected. A good example of this is provided by the case of retroactive bene-
fit allocations, which frequently occur when flat-rate benefits are renegotiated.")
50. This is particularly applicable to DB plans because defined contribution plans are
expected to be fully funded.
51. LABOIJL, supra note 1, at 75.
52. See JAMES E. PESANDO, ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION & DEV., THE CONTAIN-
MENT OF BANKRUPTCY RISK IN PRIVATE PENSION PLANS, available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/49/1815710.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2003); LABOUL,
supra note 1.
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ance is less demanding. 53
Despite the soundness of having such an insurance mechanism within a
private pension system, a very significant, yet inevitable, moral problem
must be taken into account. In his article, Barton listed three areas iden-
tified by the Goode Report where the existence of a compensation
scheme might lead employers to take decisions that would place an intol-
erable burden on the scheme:
An employer might encourage the trustees to take a less prudent in-
vestment strategy than they otherwise would because the higher the re-
turn on the scheme's investments, the lower the costs to the employer in a
balance of costs scheme. The employer stands to gain all the benefits
from a high risk investment strategy while the compensation fund would
meet the cost of any losses;
" If an employer gets into difficulties, it might favor other creditors
over the pension scheme in the knowledge that the pension
scheme would be protected by the compensation scheme if it be-
came insolvent;
* An employer may offer scheme benefit improvements as an alter-
native to wage increases. If the improvements applied to past
service or to pensions in payment, they might create or enlarge a
deficit in the pension scheme that subsequently has to be met
from the compensation scheme. 54
Therefore, as Laboul concluded, it seems advisable to set a priority on
the implementation of preventive regulations. 55 If this proved not to be
practical, then consideration could be given to insolvency insurance with
the hazards it entails and only under certain conditions. Thus, the setting
of a ceiling, or even of a deductible amount, may reduce the moral hazard
and promote better prevention by implicitly creating a situation of co-
insurance with plan members.
G. TAXATION
As already emphasized herein and in addition to all of the issues cov-
ered above, taxation is a matter of great importance to private pension
systems. In general, it could be said that the public will look for private
pensions if two main factors are present. First, whether there is confi-
dence in the system as a whole (i.e., whether the issues raised above are
well handled by regulation), and second, whether there are incentives for
concentrating funds in such a system.
Usually, taxation of private pensions impacts three main stages of a
pension fund's operation: (i) when contributions or employer or em-
ployee paid premiums are paid in; (ii) while reserves are being consti-
tuted; and (iii) when benefits are paid out. Therefore, tax legislation will
address issues such as tax deductibility and reduction, limitation of bene-
53. Pesando, supra note 50.
54. Barton (2003).
55. LABOUL, supra note 1.
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fits or contributions, mode of benefits taxation, tax status of financing
supports, taxation of interest, and inheritance taxation on benefits in case
of death. 56
In his work, Laboul makes reference in his work to general tax treat-
ments (on several countries studied) to private pension operations:
" Employer contributions are tax deductible, provided that the
plan qualifies under existing regulations;
" The tax burden does not shift to the employees, meaning that
contributions are not treated as indirect income on which em-
ployees must pay taxes;
* Employee contributions are also generally tax-deductible;
* Benefits are, in principle, taxed as regular income; and
" Income from investments and capital gains are not taxable as
long as the fund complies with applicable regulations. 57
Generally, the environment must motivate the general public, namely
employees, to allocate their savings in such a long-term investment and
there should be incentives for employers to offer such schemes to their
employees. This should be encouraged as an endeavour to foster long-
term national savings growth in developing countries, which have a signif-
icant need to finance their economy.
III. THE BRAZILIAN PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION
Private pension structures can be found in Brazilian history as early as
the sixteenth century when a hospital in Santos, Sao Paulo created a pen-
sion plan for its employees as early as 1543.58
Private pension entities were formed as montepios and caixas de pen-
soes, which were widow's funds and pension funds established by private
initiative by persons interested in a common social protection. There was
no government involvement and no presence of applicable legislation.
It was only in 1835 that legislation began to apply to such plans. A
decree was enacted that approved the Montepio da Economia dos
Servidores dos Estados statute (MONGERAL), a government sponsored
widow's fund for state civil servants. Other legislation followed 59 with
the same purposes.60
56. Gollier, supra note 40, at 44.
57. LABOUL, supra note 1.
58. See Reis 118.
59. In 1889, Decree 10.269 was enacted, creating Caixa de Pensoes dos Operarios da
Imprensa Nacional, for the government's official press employees. Law 1236, en-
acted on September 11, 1909, created Montepio Municipal de Sao Paulo to provide
pensions to widows and families of employees of the Sao Paulo municipality. De-
cree 15.674 of September 7, 1922, was aimed at Brazilian railway workers, among
others.
60. This shows a paternalistic tendency of the Brazilian government to privilege civil
servants, which can still be seen today in Brazilian pension law, and is considered
the root of the Brazilian pension system crisis, as well as the aim of pension re-
form, as discussed below.
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In 1960, Brazil enacted a pension system. It was basically formed from
several montepios and caixa de pensoes created either by governmental
initiative for the benefit of civil servants or by private entities for the
benefit of particular classes of workers. Private and public pension funds
had the same roles within the pension system. Workers, employers, and
the government funded this system.
A proper public pension system was developed only in 1960 when law
3807/60 was enacted creating the so-called Lei Organica da Previdencia
Social, which attributed to private pension funds the complementary
function.
Law 6435 enacted on July 15, 1977 regulated private pension compa-
nies and classified them as "open" or "closed" pension funds. The latter
are companies set up by employers for the benefit of its employees re-
stricted, therefore, to a particular group. Open funds are the remaining
companies, in which any individual can participate. Furthermore, closed
funds are to operate as non-profit organizations (sociedade civil sem fins
lucrativos), while open funds can operate envisaging a profit, therefore,
set up as corporations (sociedade anonima).
Law 6435 authorized insurance companies licensed to work with life
insurance to operate open pension plans, which consequently made De-
cree-Law 73/66 (the main legal statute for insurance regulation) applica-
ble to such plans as well.
As regulated by Decree 81240 enacted on January 1, 1978, and 81402
enacted on February 23, 1978, Law 6435 established that the two different
funds (open and closed) should be subjected to the supervision and regu-
lation of different governmental bodies. Conselho Nacional de Seguros
Privados (CNSP) and Superintendencia de Seguros Privados(SUSEP),
which are respectively, the regulatory and supervisory authorities for in-
surance operations, hierarchically subjected to the Ministry of Finance,
which rules and supervises open pension funds. Closed pension funds are
subjected to a similar structure. Conselho de Previdencia Complementar
(CPC) and Secretaria de Previdencia Complementar (SPC) are authori-
ties related to the Ministry of Social Security, which rules and supervises
their operations.
From the enactment of the rules above, the Brazilian pension system
was structured in a three-segment organization, which is still present to-
day. The Brazilian pension system is divided into a general regime for
private sector workers, multiple special regimes for civil servants at dif-
ferent levels of government, and a voluntary complementary regime
available to all workers. The general regime, available to private sector
workers, consists of a mandatory publicly managed pay-as-you-go
structure.
The special schemes segment for civil servants is responsible for the
Brazilian pension crisis and is the aim of pension reforms currently under
discussion. Significantly more generous than the general regime, it was
created without much consideration to actuarial principles resulting in
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immense deficits. 61 Congress is discussing several reforms, including an
initiative to equalize such special schemes with the general scheme. 62
The complementary regime, which is the scope of the discussions
herein, will be detailed throughout this work. After the above mentioned
important legal statutes were enacted during the 1970's, no substantial
legal changes were implemented until 1988 when Brazil passed a new
constitution. A particular section in the new constitution addresses pub-
lic and private pensions re-defining its main foundations (articles 201 and
202).
Article 202 of the 1988 Brazilian constitution, as amended by constitu-
tional amendment no. 20 on December 15, 1998, specifically addressed
private pensions. Private pensions had confirmed their complementary,
voluntary, and autonomous function within the Brazilian pension system.
Directives on funding, disclosure, separation of pension plan rights and
obligations from workers' labor contracts were established by article 202
and its first and second paragraphs. Furthermore, a complementary law
was established to regulate such directives. 63
Paragraphs three to six of article 202 address the special schemes,
prohibiting any direct financial assistance from the government to such
pension funds, which allows it only from the governmental authority in
the position of the relevant fund's sponsor. It also limited sponsor's con-
tribution to an amount equal to the worker's contribution (1:1). Accord-
ing to such paragraphs, a complementary law should be enacted to
regulate the relationship of governmental entities as sponsors of pension
funds and their respective pension funds. 64
Therefore, article 202 of the Brazilian constitution and complementary
Laws 108 and 109 are currently the main legal statutes in BPPS, which
regulate operations in connection thereof. Law 108 specifically addresses
the special schemes and Law 109 governs the private pension system in
general. In addition, open pension funds must observe the provisions of
Decree-Law 73/66 when applicable to their operations. Closed pensions
must observe Decree 4206, enacted on April 23, 2002.65
B. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF BPPS
As already mentioned, BPPS is independent and complementary to the
general regime, which is also considered to be a part of the Brazilian Fi-
61. PAUL BONTURI, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE BRAZILIAN PEN-
SION SYSTEM: RECENT REFORMS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD 27, available at http:/
www.olis.oecd.org/oils/2002doc.nsf/linkto/eco-wkp(2002) 26 (last visited Nov. 14,
2003).
62. The current federal government presented a proposal to Congress for a constitu-
tional amendment (PEC 40/03) by which, among other reforms, civil servant
schemes would be capped with the same limit as the general scheme. This propo-
sal was already under discussion by a different submission made to Congress, the
complementary law proposal no. 9/99, which has been replaced by PEC 40/03.
63. Put into effect by the enactment of complementary Law 109 on May 29, 2001.
64. Put into effect by the enactment of complementary Law 108 on May 29, 2001.
65. The so-called Regulamento da Previdencia Fechada (Closed Pension Decree).
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nancial System (pension funds are financial institutions according to arti-
cle 17 of Law 4595, enacted on December 31, 1964, the so-called Lei do
Sistema Financeiro Nacional (Law of National Financial System)), and
provisions applicable to financial institutions must, in general, also be ob-
served by private pension funds.
Open and closed funds are regulated by the rules mentioned above.
The special schemes are subject to closed fund regulation, in addition to
the provisions set forth by Law 108. Generally, Law 108 purported to
organize the special schemes, properly established them in the private
pension system. Law 108 imposed that the National Treasury cannot
cover any losses or deficits that special scheme funds might have. It also
established governance and supervision principles.
1. Law 109
Law 109 revoked and replaced law 6435/77, basically improving and
implementing many important concepts in the private pension system.
Some authors believe that law 6435/77 did not need to be fully revoked
and replaced, but rather that it only needed to be reformed. 66 In fact, it
was used as the basic structure for Law 109. However, it had to be com-
pletely substituted due to article 202 of the Brazilian constitution, as men-
tioned above.
Law 109 follows the principles set out by article 202 of the Brazilian
federal constitution, being emphatic of its provisions as to financial secur-
ity and beneficiaries' rights. 67 It is divided in eight chapters: (i) introduc-
tion; (ii) pension plans; (iii) closed pension funds; (iv) open pension
funds; (v) supervision; (vi) intervention and extra-judicial liquidation pro-
cedures; (vii) disciplinary regime; and (viii) miscellaneous provisions.
Article 3 of Law 109 set out directives to governmental function within
the BPPS. States should purport to (i) elaborate private pension policies;
(ii) discipline, co-ordinate, and supervise the activities regulated by Law
109, making it compatible to social security polices and social and finan-
cial development; (iii) establish minimum standards of financial and actu-
arial security, aiming specifically at preserving liquidity, solvency, and
stability of pension plans and each pension fund in the totality of their
activities; (iv) guarantee to beneficiaries full access to information in con-
nection with their benefit plans; (v) supervise pension funds and their
operations imposing penalties when applicable; and (vi) protect benefi-
ciaries' interests. Accordingly, provisions targeting those principles are
found throughout Law 109.
66. See MARTINEZ 755.
67. Article 8 of Law 109 makes distinctions in defining beneficiaries: "Participants"
are pension plan members who have not become entitled to any benefits yet and
the "assisted" are the participants or their beneficiaries receiving the plan benefits.
In the present work, the utilization of the term "beneficiaries" collectively refers to
participants and assisted, unless described differently.
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Pension plans are addressed in the second chapter of Law 109. Private
pension funds may only operate plans that they have been expressly au-
thorized to operate, and must comply with minimum standards estab-
lished by regulatory and supervisory authorities. 68 Such standards
attempt to assure transparency, solvency, liquidity, financial, and actua-
rial stability. Plans may be set up and regulated as DB, DC, variable
contribution, and other forms of plans that reflect technical evolution and
allow flexibility to the private pension regime.69
An important innovation of Law 109 is a more flexible creation and
structuring of benefit plans and pension funds. Law 6435 anticipated
closed pension funds created only by employers. Law 109 made it possi-
ble for the creation of closed pension funds by a new entity, in addition to
employers, called Sponsors by Law 109. The instituidor (originator) re-
fers to professional classes, unions, or other associations. Law 109 regu-
lates the so-called multi-sponsored entities, i.e., more than one sponsor
organized for the purpose of providing complementary pension benefits
for associates or employees. The purpose of this regulation is to allow
smaller sponsors or institutions to set up pension funds.
Law 109 also includes portability and vesting for the first time in Bra-
zilian pension law. These two elements are essential for a trustworthy pri-
vate pension system. Article 14 implements technical foundations that
apply to every pension plan. These foundations apply when portability
and vesting are probable, as well as the right of withdrawal of all contri-
butions made by the employee (minus the plan's administrative costs)
and the option for the employee to continue making contributions, even
in the event of losing his earnings totally or partially, in order to preserve
the final benefit.
In addition, article 16 of Law 109 covers non-discriminatory eligibility.
Pension plans must be offered to every employee of sponsors or associ-
ates of instituidores, including managers, directors, statutory members,
and any other executive members.
C. PROSPEcrS FOR THE FUTURE OF BRAZILIAN PRIVATE PENSIONS
The Brazilian private pension system envisages a perspective of sub-
stantial growth as it has continued to grow over the past few years. Tech-
nical reserves have grown from a total of R$75 billion in 1994 to R$240
billion on April 2003 (approximately, £25 and £48 billion, respectively). 70
68. Some private pension plans have not been fully regulated yet.
69. Braz. C.F. art. 202 Complementary Law 109, arts. 6-7.
70. See ABRAPP, at http:/www.abrapp.org.br/abrapp.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003)
and ANAAP, at http://www.anapp.com.br/publique/cgi/publiccgilua.exe/web/tem-
plates/htm/anapp/home.htm?uswer=reader (last visited Nov. 13, 2003). ABRAPP
is the Brazilian association of closed pension funds, and ANAPP is the Brazilian
association of open pension funds. Each entity provides the data for their relevant
segment (open or closed), therefore the numbers are the approximated sums of
such data (open + closed).
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It is believed that such numbers will triple by 200871 due to two important
elements: the pension reforms, currently under discussion in Congress,
and the development of pension funds by instituidores and multi-spon-
sored funds.
1. Brazilian Pension Reforms
The main goal of the pension reforms in Brazil, which are expected to
take place in2003, is to combat the immense actuarial deficits of the spe-
cial schemes. The deficits reached approximately R$70 billion (approxi-
mately £14 billion) in 2002.72
One of the measures pursued by Brazilian pension reform is to cap the
special schemes substantially by reducing the value of benefits offered in
accordance with current legislation. This cap could lead to a considerable
expansion for private pensions in Brazil, since workers in the special
schemes would look for additional schemes should they desire a higher
income after their retirement. In other words, there are approximately
five million civil servants that could potentially become members of other
private pension plans.73
Moreover, there is also a proposal under discussion for a constitutional
amendment, PEC 453/2003, which purports to insert into paragraphs
three to six of article 202 of the Brazilian Constitution the possibility that
private pension plans operate in the special schemes. This plan could
lead to a substantial shift of reserves to the administration of private com-
panies, especially open funds.
More importantly, such a great expansion in the private pension indus-
try would increase Brazil's internal savings substantially. These savings
could help the economy reach levels that would fuel the nation's financ-
ing needs. Pension funds are main players in regard to a nation's internal
savings. As an example, the United States' internal savings are over
US$10 trillion of which US$7 trillion are originated by the pension and
insurance industries. 7 4
2. Pension Funds Created by Instituidores
Instituidores may now provide pension plans to their affiliates. Resolu-
tion CGPC no. 12 enacted September 17, 2002, as amended by Resolu-
tion 03 dated May 22, 2003, regulated the instituidores' activities.
71. Suely Caldas, Previdencia Privada Deve Triplicar no Pais Are 2008, available
at http:llwww.bancoriosdf.com.br/html/noticias/2003lprevidencialprevidencia-pri
vadadeve-triplicar_.htm (last visited June 15, 2003).
72. ClAudia Izique, Previdencia, Urgente Revista, 390, American Chamber of Com-
merce in Brazil - AMCHAM (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.amcham.com.br.
73. Ministerio de Previdencia Social, at http:/www.mpas.gov.br (last visited Nov. 13,
2003). According to data available at the Ministry of Social Security website, there
are currently 3.7 million active and 1.6 million inactive civil servants, who are
members of special schemes for civil servants.
74. Antonio Penteado Mendonca, 0 Outro Lado da Previdtncia Privada, available at
http://federativo.bndes.gov.br/bf-bancos/noticias/n0002116.pdf (last visited June
30, 2003).
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Instituidores may set up closed pension funds or establish pension plans
with another pension fund (Resolution CGPC no. 12, article 3). Its tech-
nical reserves must be administered by specialized intermediaries (finan-
cial institutions) duly authorized to operate by the Brazilian Central
Bank (BACEN). The financial institution must segregate such reserves
from its own assets (article 3, paragraphs 2 and 3). A resolution was also
issued by Conselho Monetario Nacional (CMN) forcing financial institu-
tions to segregate the assets of third parties. 75 For example, the adminis-
tration of third party funds shall be carried out separately from other
activities performed by the financial institutions.76
Moreover, pension plans created by instituidores must be structured in
the DC category and funded by the beneficiaries. Employers may elect
to make contributions to their employee's plans by executing a formal
agreement with the relevant instituidor.
Instituidor pension funds could lead to an expansion of the private pen-
sion industry in Brazil. This expansion could follow international exper-
iences, such as United States, where union pension funds hold a
substantial portion of American pension fund's total reserves. 77 However,
Brazilian unions do not seem to be prepared yet. There is significant
work to be done within union organizations in order to make such institu-
tions compatible to handling an enterprise such as a pension fund.
3. General Remarks
Law 109 has more than twenty provisions requiring additional regula-
tion. From such provisions, some have been either fully or partially regu-
lated, whereas others have not received the proper attention from the
relevant authorities yet. 78
For example, one of the main concerns of the private pension industry
is the regulation of portability. Resolution CGPC No. 09, dated June 27,
2002, has already implemented certain concepts and minimum require-
ments, including grace periods related to the entitlement to portability79
(five years for plans created after Law 109 and ten years for plans created
75. As established by Law 4.595/65 (as amended), BACEN is the supervising body of
the National Financial System. BACEN is hierarchically subjected to the CMN,
which is the ultimate deliberative department of the National Financial System.
CMN is responsible for issuing basic policies and regulations that govern the finan-
cial system. Decisions of the Council are implemented as resolutions, made public
by BACEN and signed by its president. BACEN issues circulars implementing the
resolutions.
76. Resolution CMN 2451, November 27, 1997; BACEN Resolution 2486, April 30,
1998.
77. Caldas, supra note 69.
78. Some of these provisions are related to financial security issues and will be ad-
dressed in the next section.
79. The second paragraph of article 14 of Law 109 empowers the supervisory and reg-
ulatory authorities to set such a grace period.
2004]
24 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 10
before Law 109).80 However, Resolution CGPC No. 09 did not present a
method for the calculation of the portable amount leaving it to be regu-
lated by further complementary norms.
Finally, it should be noted that a substantial portion of the population
depends on a very low income for survival. Therefore, many people are
not capable of joining any complementary scheme. In other words, the
general regime is extremely necessary to look after this portion of the
population.
A private pension scheme is still inaccessible to a part of Brazilian pop-
ulation. With an underdeveloped public health system, low-income
Brazilians would first seek to join a private health plan (which, by itself, is
very costly to them - up to 10 percent of their income), before consider-
ing any type of retirement benefit.81 As the Brazilian public health sys-
tem improves, this culture might also change towards a greater concern
for retirement.
IV. FINANCIAL SECURITY OF BPPS
In section 1 above, seven main pillars were identified and described as
the foundation of a private pension's financial soundness. This section
investigates and assesses BPPS regulations in relation to each of the
pillars.
A. REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY STRUCTURES
As already mentioned, BPPS regulatory and supervisory framework is
divided into second and third pillar pensions: closed and open funds sub-
jected to CGPC/SPC and CNSP/SUSEP's regulatory and supervisory
scrutiny, respectively.
This formation is seen in article 74 of Law 109 as a temporary measure,
since the terms of article 5 provide that a new law will be issued, which
properly establishes a regulatory and supervisory framework and its foun-
dations. There are already projects under discussion, but still far from
implementation. The projects plan for the creation of a specialized
agency for private pensions.8 2
It cannot be said that the current structure is ineffective, but the propo-
sal for a new specialized agency could have positive effects for BPPS. In
the current structure, there are four different governmental authorities
that deal with BPPS. Sometimes these authorities focus their efforts on
identical matters. A single regulatory and supervisory authority could
80. The regulation cited in this paragraph refers to closed pension funds. Portability
for closed pension funds has its own calculation methods and different grace
periods.
81. Joao Batista Natali, Piano de Satide Corrdi Renda dos Mais Pobres, available at
wwwl.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult9lu67689.shtm (last visited May 28,
2004).
82. Autarquia Para Previdencia Complementar, available at http:/www.seguros.com.br
(last visited Jul. 18, 2003).
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deal more effectively with differences in the regulation of open and
closed funds.
Another possibility could be to shift the regulation and supervision of
closed funds to CNSP and SUSEP. This shift should occur only if it is
found to be a less costly and burdensome alternative than the creation of
a new agency. In any case, the regulation and supervision of private pen-
sions should be subjected to the Ministry of Finance's governmental bod-
ies due to the similarities of the insurance business and the importance
they represent to financial markets. There is a need for compatibility
with social security policies and Ministry of Social Security action should
be limited to such policies.
As to the provisions in BPPS regulatory and supervisory framework
related to the building blocks mentioned above, several supervisory is-
sues are found in Law 109 and other inferior regulations. A special chap-
ter of Law 109 is dedicated to supervision (articles 41 to 43). Other
concepts are spread throughout Law 109's other seven chapters.8 3
As previously mentioned, pension funds and pension plans require for-
mal authorization from regulatory and supervisory authorities before
they can operate.8 This includes their statutes, plan provisions, and any
amendment in connection thereof. Sponsor withdrawals, elections of ex-
ecutive and statutory members, mergers, acquisitions, spin-offs, or any
other kind of corporate restructuring, as well as the transfer of sponsor-
ship, plan participants, plan, and reserves between funds are also sub-
jected to prior authorization (Law 109, articles 25, 33 and 38).
Both regulatory and supervisory authorities for open and closed funds
have issued regulations in connection with licensing that require a consid-
erably extensive list of documentation, procedures, and standards to be
met for the creation of pension plans and pension funds. Resolutions
CNSP 65/01 and 73/02, respectively, set out rules for the election of exec-
utive members and the minimum capital for the constitution of an open
fund.8 5 Procedural measures for filing requests for authorization from
regulatory and supervisory bodies are regulated in Circulars SUSEP 122/
00 and 188/02. Closed funds must mainly observe Ordinance SPC 27/
2001.86
As to monitoring and inspections, the main rules in Law 109 are as
follows:
* Article 22: Closed funds must submit annual reports to supervi-
sors with accounting measures and actuarial evaluations;
* Article 23: A closed fund must keep updated accounting records,
consolidate the position of its plans, and submit the information
to independent auditors. Annually, closed funds must prepare
consolidated reports on their accounting and actuarial position;
83. Law 109, articles 41-43.
84. Law 109, articles 13, 33 and 38.
85. Resolutions CNSP 65/01 and 73/02.
86. Ordinance SPC 2712001.
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" Article 40: Open funds must prepare monthly financial state-
ments in accordance with rules established by regulatory authori-
ties. Insurance companies that operate pension funds must
distinguish pension activities on such statements;
" Article 41: Provides supervisors with the authority to access pen-
sion funds, as well as all of the records and other relevant materi-
als they may require. Supervisors may even request and
apprehend documents. Any obstruction to these requests will be
subjected to legal sanctions. This authority to investigate reaches
sponsors and instituidores as far as the relevant pension fund's
aspects are involved (article 41, paragraph one). Sponsors and
Instituidores are also responsible for supervising the activities of
the pension fund to which they are connected (article 41, para-
graph two). In addition, any person subjected to the provisions
of Law 109 is obliged to provide requested information to regula-
tory and supervisory authorities (article 41, paragraph three).
Law 109 also sets out corrective and punitive measures. Articles 42
and 43 allow for intervention in the administration of the fund by the
supervisor in the event that certain conditions are met (e.g., insufficient
reserves, irregularities on asset management, breach of a plan's contrac-
tual or statutory provisions, potential harm to a fund's solvency, and actu-
arial unbalances).
Article 42 refers to intervention in closed funds, while article 43 ad-
dresses open funds. The main difference is that for open funds, the per-
son nominated by the supervisor to intervene in the administration of the
fund does not have executive powers, whereas the supervisor does have
executive power in the case of closed funds.
Furthermore, Law 109 dedicates a chapter to disciplinary regime,
which discussed civil liability to fund executives, managers, and statutory
members for any damages they might cause with regard to the fund. This
liability is extended to sponsors and instituidores executives, actuaries, in-
dependent auditors, managing evaluators, and other professionals who
might render technical services to the fund either directly or indirectly
(article 63). The public defense office must be notified of the criminal
offense (art. 64).
Decree 4206/02 also enumerates forty different violations that may be
subjected to penalties under Law 109. These violations include non-com-
pliance to investment regulations and disregard to beneficiaries' requests
for information.
Law 109 encompasses main issues of concern to supervisors, gathering
principles related to the three building blocks suggested by the Basle
Committee for banking supervision and extendable to private pensions,
as defended by ROCHA, Hinz and Gutierrez. Regulations are developing
and most of the provisions mentioned above find complementary rules in
CNSP or CGPC regulation.
However, special attention should be paid to article 41 of Law 109.
Indeed, it gives full authority to supervisory bodies, but it still requires a
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more detailed regulation of on-site supervision. A good example to fol-
low is BACEN's Supervision Manual, which established several proce-
dures in connection with on-site supervision. It provides the financial
markets with transparency as to BACEN's methods of on-site
supervision.
B. GOVERNANCE RULES
Law 109 focuses more on the governance of closed funds. Open funds
are regular sociedades anonimas just as any other financial institution.
Therefore, Brazilian insurance and corporate law shape the main features
of the governance of open funds.
In addition, Law 108 focuses on the governance structure of pension
funds of the special schemes. It dedicates fifteen of its thirty-two articles
to the special scheme governance structure.
As previously mentioned, closed funds are set up as foundations or as-
sociations without envisaging a profit (Law 109, article 31, paragraph
one).8 7 Closed funds are subjected to the directives established in Law
109, in addition to the provisions on associations and foundations pro-
vided in the Brazilian Civil Code (Law 10496 dated January 10, 2002).
Closed pension funds must keep a minimal governance structure,
formed by their deliberative boards, fiscal boards, and the executive man-
agement (conselho deliberativo, conselho fiscal, and diretoria executiva).
Plan member representatives must occupy one-third of the positions on
both boards (Law 109, article 35).
The deliberative board is the highest governing body in a pension
fund's governing structure. It is responsible for the substantial decision
making process within the pension fund's administration. However, the
execution of its decisions is left to the executive management. The fiscal
board is responsible for assuring that the pension fund complies with laws
and regulations, as well as with internal resolutions. The fiscal board is
also responsible for assessing the pension fund's accounting and finances.
Members of the deliberative and fiscal boards must have appropriate
professional experience and not have been convicted in any administra-
tive proceeding regarding social security laws or as civil servant. Execu-
tive management members must, in addition to these requirements, have
superior education (Law 109, article 35, paragraphs three and four).
Among the members of the executive management, someone has to be
nominated to be responsible for the administration of the fund's assets
and such nomination must be disclosed to the regulatory and supervisory
authorities. Other members of the executive management are jointly re-
sponsible with the nominated member for any damages or losses to the
pension fund that they might cause (Law 109, article 35, paragraphs five
and six). In addition, the fund must hire a custodian duly registered with
87. Association is the present denomination to sociedade civil.
2004]
28 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 10
the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissao de Valores
Mobiliarios - CVM) (Resolutions CMN no. 2829 and 2859).
As to governance mechanisms, 88 the main instrument is the previously
mentioned requirement of Law 109 that one-third of the positions in the
deliberative and fiscal boards be occupied by plan member representa-
tives. Internal control is still a matter that needs to be addressed further
by regulation.
In fact, only a few provisions covering insurance and pension regula-
tion can be identified to relate to internal controls. Most of the provi-
sions relate to anti-money laundering practices, ignoring important issues
such as an adequate treatment of operational risks.
Again, experience from the banking sector can be used. Although not
fully developed, BACEN's regulations on internal controls are much
more advanced than what is currently available in the private pension
industry. BACEN's resolution 2554, as amended, requires financial insti-
tutions under its supervision to implement internal controls effective and
consistent with the nature, complexity, and risk of operations carried out
by said institutions.
C. DISCLOSURE
It can be said that disclosure is one of the main concerns of BPPS regu-
lation. From article 202 of Brazilian constitution and Law 109 to inferior
SUSEP and SPC regulations, transparency and disclosure are exhaus-
tively covered throughout their provisions.
The first paragraph of article 202 of the Brazilian constitution dele-
gated to Law 109 the duty to assure to plan participants full access to
fund information. Law 109 carried out this task by addressing disclosure
in several of its provisions, namely articles 10 and 24.
Article 10 of Law 109 establishes that minimum requirements, as set
out by regulatory and supervisory authorities, must be present in pension
plans, contracts, proposals, applications, and certificates. Its first para-
graph goes further, setting up documents that must be accessible to pro-
spective plan members and provided to new plan members, and listing
information that must be expressed in such documents (e.g., eligibility,
calculation methods for benefits, and features of the plan).
Article 24 addresses closed fund transparency. Plan members must be
informed about their plan's position at least annually, according to rules
passed by supervisors and regulators. In addition, article 24 grants par-
ticipants the right of access to fund information, upon request, that might
be useful for the protection of their rights or for clarifications of their
own interest.
As previously mentioned, closed funds must submit annual reports to
supervisors with accounting demonstrations and actuarial evaluations
(Law 109, article 22), and open funds must prepare monthly financial
88. Reporting and disclosure will be specifically addressed in the next subsection.
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statements in accordance with rules established by regulatory authorities
(article 40). SUSEP's Circular 189 dated May 24, 2002 is the current rule
in connection with the frequent reporting by open funds. Open funds
must submit different forms to SUSEP on different regularities (monthly,
quarterly, and bi-annually), the so-called formulario de informacoes peri-
odicas (FIP).
BACEN's regulation as to the investment of closed pension fund assets
also impose a set of rules related to disclosing to plan participants infor-
mation about the investment policies of the fund, operational costs in-
curred, and investment results (Res. 2829, articles 7 and 8, as amended).
In general, both open and closed funds are subject to several provisions
that require them to provide supervisors with extensive information, from
investment demonstratives to benefits offered. In addition, plan partici-
pants can find several provisions in the relevant regulations that protect
their right to comprehensive access to information related to the plan
and/or fund with which they are associated.
D. INVESTMENT REGULATIONS
The main Brazilian rules on investment of pension fund assets are in
Law 109, articles 9 and 28, which establish directives to closed and open
fund investments, respectively. Brazilian regulation follows a quantita-
tive approach with an extensive set of ceilings and limits set forth in
CMN's resolutions and BACEN circulars. 89
Resolution CMN 3034 for open funds and 2829 for closed funds and
their respective amendments establish ceilings, limits, and requirements
of diversification in connection with the assets in which funds might in-
vest. Other rules, such as Resolution CNSP 98/2002 for open funds and
Ordinances SPC 30, 36, and 40 complement the investment regulation
framework.
Security, profitability, solvency, and liquidity are principles repeatedly
mentioned throughout the regulation of investments. The general struc-
ture of such regulations are formed by provisions establishing (i) seg-
ments in which assets should be allocated; (ii) permitted asset types and
classes; (iii) ceilings for investments in each permitted asset class; and (iv)
diversification requirements or limits on holdings of securities by issuer
and issuances.
The regulation of open fund investment is the same as that applied to
insurance companies. It follows the structure summarized above. Seg-
ments for asset. allocation are divided into fixed income, variable income,
and real estate. Each of the three segments counts toward ceilings re-
lated to the investment in particular asset classes (e.g., pension funds may
invest up to 100 percent of their reserves in fixed-income investments
89. Although the financial system authorities (CMN and BACEN) are in charge of
regulating the investments of open and closed pension funds, their respective regu-
lators and supervisors have also issued rules imposing restrictions and require-
ments in connection with their investment policies, as will be discussed below.
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linked to government securities; 12 percent in urban real estate; and 30
percent in stocks listed in stock markets).90
It is important to mention that CMN's rules establish a set of require-
ments in connection with the quality of issuer of securities, namely the
level of corporate governance present in the issuer's businesses. This is
mainly controlled by BOVESPA (Sao Paulo Stock Exchange) principles
of corporate governance. 91
In regard to diversification requirements, open funds cannot hold more
than 5 percent of debt instruments from the same issuer; 20 percent of
other securities issued by a financial institution; and 10 percent of securi-
ties issued by other companies. In addition, there are limits related to
holding quotas of investment funds and securities issuances (e.g., there is
a limit of 25 percent of the relevant issuance for securities in general,
except for some equity instruments).
Closed funds also have a similar set of rules that differ slightly in limits
and variety of asset classes. Closed funds are divided into four segments.
In addition to the three segments in open fund regulation (fixed income,
variable income, and real estate), there is a fourth segment: financing and
loans, focusing on transactions with plan participants, namely loans and
real estate financing. Segments are more complex and extensive, due to
rules dividing each segment into different portfolios:
SEGMENT PORTFOLIOS
Fixed income: Fixed income with low credit risk;
Fixed income with medium or high credit risk.
Variable income: Stocks;
Venture capital;
Variable income - other assets.
Real Estate: Real estate projects;
Leasing and proceeds;
Real estate investment funds;
Real estate - other investments.
Loans and Financing: Loans to plan participants;
Real estate financing to plan participants.
Each segment is divided into different portfolios (mainly by different
levels of risk) and regulations list permissible assets forming each portfo-
lio and apply limits and ceilings within each of those portfolios. Moreo-
ver, there are several diversification requirements applicable to all
segments.
In general, regulation of pension fund investments in Brazil are very
stringent, although this can be justified by the early developing stage of
90. Resolution CMN 3034, arts. 4 & 10.
91. Corporations voluntarily commit themselves to high standards of corporate gov-
ernance and disclosure that are much more demanding than those required by law.
BOVESPA lists such companies in a different division, the so-called "New
Market."
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the current market. This does not mean that private pension entities are
not on pace with modern principles and techniques applicable to the pen-
sion industry. It only means that substantial growth is still expected. On
the other hand, the set of rules set out by Law 109 on governance, disclo-
sure, and supervision already creates an environment that permits a grad-
ual softening of investment regulation toward a more flexible approach.
In addition, the rules mentioned above address issues related to re-
stricted operations (such as foreign investments), registrations with CVM
and clearinghouses, and specific requirements in connection with certain
investment funds.
Foreign investments are generally not allowed. Resolutions CMN 2829
for closed funds, and CNSP 98/02 for open funds both expressly forbid
foreign investments, though there are exceptions for cases allowed by
CMN regulation. However, there is no permitted direct foreign invest-
ment in CMN and BACEN regulations.
There are only a few alternatives of investments linked to foreign cur-
rencies, subjected to very low ceilings: (i) fundo de investimento no exte-
rior (FIEX) an investment fund with a portfolio formed by national and
foreign securities; (ii) equity of corporations from MERCOSUR coun-
tries; and (iii) Brazilian depositary receipts (BDR) securities issued by
foreign corporations, in which distribution has been authorised by CVM.
Thus, foreign investment alternatives for Brazilian pension funds are
severely limited-practically non-existent. However, Brazilian needs for
increasing national savings and investment in the domestic market are
significant, therefore such a regulatory approach is justified.
E. FUNDING REQUIREMENTS
Brazilian private pension schemes are run by self-administered pension
funds both in the open and closed segments. Employers may also seek
group insurance mechanisms with an open pension fund (Law 109, arti-
cles 2 and 26). Articles 18 to 21 refer to closed pension fund funding
rules:
Article 18: A funding plan that must be reviewed at least annually shall
establish the level of contributions required to cover the fund's obliga-
tions. At all times pension funds must be able to cover commitments
they undertook, except for any exemptions made by regulatory and su-
pervisory authorities in connection with this rule. 92
Article 19: This article addresses extraordinary contributions in the
case of underfunding (sole paragraph, item II).
Article 20: Surpluses must be directed towards the constitution of a
contingency reserve to guarantee benefits up to the limit of 25 percent of
the total amount of the fund's reserves. Amounts beyond such a limit
92. This allows supervisors to require the utilization of approaches similar to ABO/
PBO, as well as provide a level of flexibility for temporary limited under-funding
in restricted circumstances.
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must constitute another special reserve, which, if not used in three con-
secutive years, will implicate an obligatory revision of the pension plan.
Article 21: Deficits in pension plans or pension funds must be rectified
by employers, employees, and beneficiaries using the same proportion of
their usual contributions. This might be done by increasing contributions,
creating additional ones, or reducing benefits to be granted.
Open funds must comply with solvency and liquidity margins, as estab-
lished by CNSP and SUSEP. In addition, an open fund's net worth has to
be maintained at a level greater than its liabilities (Law 109, article 37,
item III).
The provisions listed above are general guidelines to the principles dis-
cussed in section 1 above. Law 109 delegates to regulators and supervi-
sors the burden of implementing complementary rules on several issues,
including funding rules. However, not all of these delegations have been
fully developed yet. Much of this task is left to the discretion of the su-
pervisors on a case-by-case basis when exercising off-site and on-site
supervision.
F. SOLVENCY MECHANISMS
Although not implemented, Law 109 foresees two solvency mecha-
nisms: facultative reinsurance and solvency fund (article 11). Both instru-
ments are aimed at assuring commitments assumed by pension funds with
plan participants and beneficiaries. However, the impression left by arti-
cle 11 is that not enough thought was put into drafting such provisions.
Open and closed pension funds may contract reinsurance to guarantee
their obligations. In addition, regulators and supervisors may determine
when reinsurance should be contracted.
The provision is silent as to the form of such reinsurance, which gives
the impression that the draftsmen were certain that the market could de-
velop such a product at a viable cost. As previously discussed, many
countries have concluded that reinsurance is not a product that can be
easily managed. In addition, it was not taken into consideration that Bra-
zil has a very underdeveloped reinsurance market that only recently has
gone through a very complex, slow, and bureaucratic process of
privatization.
Solvency fund is foreseen in article 11 available to closed funds. No
specification was made to ease the interpretation of this provision. One
interpretation that could be drawn, although with uncertainty, is that this
provision was indeed inspired by international experiences of plan termi-
nation insurance. This interpretation is taken from the fact the solvency
fund is restricted to closed funds and such solvency fund must be insti-
tuted by law so that governmental involvement would be present.
In any case, the provision failed to assess that Brazilian pension funds
are subjected to the funding rules mentioned above, which requires pen-
sion funds at all times to cover commitments they undertook, as well as to
consider anti-moral hazard provisions. In fact, this issue might have not
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been an issue for the draftsmen because such mechanisms are practically
impossible to implement under the current BPPS and, as an obvious con-
sequence, no inferior regulation in connection with this issue has been
considered by regulators and supervisors.
G. TAXATION
Several pieces of regulation apply to the taxation of Brazilian pension
funds, from Law 109 and Laws 10.426/2002 and 10.431/2002 to complex
regulations issued by the Federal Revenue and Customs Secretary
(Secretaria da Receita Federal - SRF). In general, the three stages (con-
tributions, funding, and benefits) are taxed as described below:
Contributions: Article 69 of Law 109 sets forth that employer and em-
ployee contributions to pension funds are deductible and exempt for in-
come tax purposes. However certain limits established by law must be
observed. For instance, Decree 3000/99, the so-called income tax regula-
tion (RIR), limits employee deductions of contributions made to pension
plans to 12 percent of their total taxable income.
Funding: Income from investments and capital gains of sponsored pen-
sion plans is subject to regular income tax at the rates set by current legis-
lation. Pension funds may also opt for a special regime of taxation, in
which their income from investments and capital gains are taxed based on
the results presented every quarter at a 20 percent rate. Individual plans
are exempt from income tax (Provisional Measure 2222, dated September
4, 2001, Law 10431, dated April 24, 2002., and Ordinance SRF No. 126,
dated January 25, 2002).
Benefits: Benefits are also subject to income tax above a certain limit
(R$ 900.00 per month) at rates of 15 or 27.5 percent, depending on the
amount of the monthly pension (RIR, articles 39, 620 and 633).
Therefore, sponsored funds have a significant tax burden. Indeed, tax-
ation should apply to pension fund operations, however, plan participant
funds should not be included, otherwise the constitution of long-term sav-
ings can be jeopardised seriously. The smaller the burden of taxation on
plan member funds, the greater the reserves accumulated and the invest-
ments in the economy.9 3
Taxation on funding could persist in a system where qualifying criteria
were implemented for favorable tax treatment. In other words, only
funds that do not meet the qualifying criteria could be taxed on their
income on investments and capital gains. This idea is based on the princi-
ples of U.S. pension law, which establish a series of conditions for a pen-
sion plan to be able to benefit from a tax favorable treatment.94
93. Antonio Penteado Mendonca, Previdencia Privada e Tributacao, available at http://
www.bancariosdf.com.br/html/noticias/2003/previdencia/o-outro ladoda-preevi
dencia_.htm (last visited June 30. 2003).
94. Mark J. Irwy, Regulation and Supervision of Private Pensions in the United States,
available at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00038000/M00038086.pdf (last visited Nov.
13, 2003).
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While deductions and exemptions on contributions might be viewed as
an incentive, taxation on funding may bring about a concern in connec-
tion with the costs of operating a pension fund, especially in connection
with accumulating reserves or even constituting contingency reserves,
therefore pushing away employer interests in offering such benefits to
employees.
V. CONCLUSION
From the set of rules implemented to BPPS in the past five years it is
easily observed that regulators have been following the development of
concepts of financial security issues internationally. Financial security of
the pension system is emphasized repeatedly and several concepts can be
found in international studies, such as the ones utilized herein.
However, internationally accepted concepts were not always wisely im-
plemented, since local considerations were not taken into account (e.g.,
the case of solvency mechanisms). Taxation also requires a revision, or at
least an assessment, on the weight of the burden currently imposed to
pension funding.
On the other hand, one has to admit that Brazilian regulation complies
with good standards of security (at least overall), especially when consid-
ering the early developmental stage of BPPS. These good standards of
security give rise to a conclusion that regulation is developing and will
develop with the market accordingly.
Nonetheless, the main problems that slow down BPPS growth are more
connected to the social and economic factors existent in the Brazilian
economy than regulation itself. The low-income population and lack of a
long-term savings oriented culture, resultant from a lack of confidence in
the financial markets due to past experiences (e.g. confiscatory measures
and high inflation), are the main barriers to BPPS expansion.
